A theoretical approach to the demand and supply for peacekeeping

Vincenzo Bove

Abstract


The post-cold war period is characterized by peace operations and negotiations, with increased size, number, and intensity of external interventions, particularly those sponsored by multilateral organizations. This article examines some factors that influence the demand for peacekeeping missions, i.e., conflict situations that invite third-party interventions, as well as the supply of peacekeeping, the ability and desire of states to intervene elsewhere through peacekeeping missions. On the demand side, a framework is developed that synthesizes the main obstacles to peacekeeping intervention, in particular the role of overconfidence, and explains how interpersonal preferences, such as the desire for vengeance, contribute to conflict escalation. On the supply side, the article explains some of the conditions determining countries' contribution to peace missions.

Keywords


Peacekeeping

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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.15355/epsj.6.2.26

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