External actors’ role in solving local collective action problems in a post-conflict setting: A case study of Turkish Cypriot beekeepers


  • Omer Gokcekus Seton Hall University
  • Clare Finnegan
  • Huseyin Cakal




Cyprus, post-conflict, beekeepers, collective action


In addition to legal constraints and social-psychological barriers, in a post-conflict setting mutually beneficial economic transactions might not occur due to the widening gap between the health, quality, and environmental standards of the parties. A lack of incentives during the years of conflict prevent the members of the weaker party, the one economically isolated from the rest of the world, from engaging in the collective learning necessary to upgrade the health and packaging standards of their commodities. In this study, we detail the technical, political, and legal challenges external actors must consider in order to successfully help small businesses in a post-conflict environment. Specifically, we explain how the EU helped Turkish Cypriot beekeepers by supplying funds to support training and educational programs, and upgrade the equipment used by the beekeepers. We demonstrate that third parties, like the EU, can provide the impetus for domestic institutions—such as producers associations, chambers of commerce, and cooperatives—to overcome their collective action problem. [JEL codes: D74, H56, O1]

Author Biography

Omer Gokcekus, Seton Hall University

OMER GOKCEKUS, PhD in Economics (Duke University, 1994); Professor of International Economics and Development, School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University (2003–); current main interests: trade and conflict, political economy, and wine economics. Publication outlets include American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Economics Letters, Economics and Politics, Journal of Wine Economics, and Public Choice. Forthcoming Book: Peculiar Dynamics of Corruption (World Scientific, Sept. 2014).


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How to Cite

Gokcekus, O., Finnegan, C., & Cakal, H. (2014). External actors’ role in solving local collective action problems in a post-conflict setting: A case study of Turkish Cypriot beekeepers. The Economics of Peace and Security Journal, 9(2). https://doi.org/10.15355/epsj.9.2.19




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