Extractive industries in fragile states and the role of market incentives and regulation

Gilles Carbonnier

Abstract


This article considers the so-called resource curse plaguing fragile states with abundant extractive resources. It critically assesses the assumption that nonstate actors such as extractive industries, civil society organizations, and investors have the ability to exert effective pressure on - and can significantly assist - governments in promoting transparency, accountability, and sound management of extractive revenues. As a contribution to this under-researched area, the role of economic actors (extractive industries, investors, financial institutions, consumers) and the effect of market incentives and regulation is examined.

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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.15355/epsj.5.2.30

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