Economics of intolerance and social conflict

Partha Gangopadhyay

Abstract


An important consensus today is that intolerance and social conflict have a substantial economic dimension. This article models a person's "returns" to acts of intolerance in terms of social approval or disapproval that this person's peer-group may offer. It is found that high levels of intolerance may persist (that is, society is “in equilibrium") even as this imposes economic costs.

Keywords


Intolerance; social conflict; game theory

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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.15355/epsj.4.2.23

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