EXTERNAL ACTORS’ ROLE IN SOLVING LOCAL COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEMS IN A POST-CONFLICT SETTING: A CASE STUDY OF TURKISH CYPROT BEEKEEPERS

OMER GOKCEKUS, CLARE FINNEGAN, AND HUSEYIN CAKAL

Omer Gokcekus is Professor of International Economics and Development, School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University, South Orange, NJ, USA. The corresponding author, he may be reached at omer.gokcekus@shu.edu. Clare Finnegan, a student at Seton Hall University, may be reached at clare.finnegan@student.shu.edu. Huseyin Cakal is a Research Fellow at the Washington Singer Laboratories, University of Exeter, Exeter, U.K., and may be reached at H.Cakal@exeter.ac.uk.

Abstract
In addition to legal constraints and social-psychological barriers, in a post-conflict setting mutually beneficial economic transactions might not occur due to the widening gap between the health, quality, and environmental standards of the parties. A lack of incentives during the years of conflict prevent the members of the weaker party, the one economically isolated from the rest of the world, from engaging in the collective learning necessary to upgrade the health and packaging standards of their commodities. In this study, we detail the technical, political, and legal challenges external actors must consider in order to successfully help small businesses in a post-conflict environment. Specifically, we explain how the EU helped Turkish Cypriot beekeepers by supplying funds to support training and educational programs, and upgrade the equipment used by the beekeepers. We demonstrate that third parties, like the EU, can provide the impetus for domestic institutions—such as producers associations, chambers of commerce, and cooperatives—to overcome their collective action problem.

Post-conflict societies face unique economic development challenges. In addition to objective obstacles, such as legal constraints that can reinforce lines of division and further hinder economic integration, subjective obstacles, such as social-psychological barriers erected by former animosities, often prevent mutually beneficial economic transactions from occurring between communities with a history of conflict. In this article we focus on a third constraint to post-conflict economic development, the collective action problem as associated with health, quality, and environmental standards.1

During conflict, members of the weaker community—e.g., the one economically isolated from the rest of the world—often lack the necessary incentives to maintain standards parity with the stronger community. In the post-conflict environment, the disparity between the two communities’ industrial, agricultural, and manufacturing products merely widens. Although individual domestic actors within the isolated community might want to adopt higher standards, the technical, political, and legal challenges associated with standards adjustment are too great to be achieved using a single actor’s resources.

Accordingly, in this study we claim that in addition to legal constraints and social-psychological barriers, economic transactions between the two communities might not occur due to the gap between their health, quality, and environmental standards. However, assistance by an external actor can help local actors collectivize and address their standards deficiencies. To provide evidence to support or refute this claim, we specifically focus on the case of Turkish Cypriot beekeepers and the trade of Turkish Cypriot honey across the so-called Green Line, which separates Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities on the island of Cyprus.2 How the small-scale, Turkish Cypriot beekeepers organized, made their association functional, improved the standards by which their honey is produced, and ultimately became eligible for trade with the help of the EU is an important case for the study of external actors’ role in solving post-conflict collective action problems.

In what follows, we first briefly discuss the collective action problem. Second, we introduce the post-conflict environment in Cyprus and EU legislation referred to as the Green Line regulation. Third, we provide basic statistics regarding Turkish Cypriot beekeeping. Fourth, we explain the activities the EU initiated in cooperation with the local actors. Finally, we provide some concluding remarks.

The collective action problem
Due to the limits of individual actors, society often relies upon groups to provide collective (or public) goods. However, various factors can waylay the provision of these common benefits. The nonexcludable nature of a collective good means
that once that good is produced, it cannot be denied to nonpayers. The inability to ensure that those accessing the good contribute to its provision encourages free-ridership. The likelihood of free-ridership increases the more complicated the problem, the smaller the size of the individual actors involved, and the larger the number of actors.³

The collective action problem is particularly acute when groups are large and the resources of individuals are small. The large size of the group encourages members to free-ride since their nonparticipation will likely be overlooked, while the small size of individual group members makes widespread participation necessary for the group’s success. Although all members of the group may recognize the benefits of the public good, their limited resources prevent individuals from acting on their own. In some cases, the individual resources of the group members might be so limited that, even if the tendency toward free-ridership is mitigated, the group itself cannot solve the issue at hand. Post-conflict developing countries, like Cyprus, provide a good illustration of the classic collective action problem, since the financial and technical resources of local actors are often particularly constrained.

Cyprus and its Green Line regulation

In 1914, Cyprus was annexed by Britain after more than 300 years of Ottoman rule. Britain had occupied the island since 1878, although it remained nominally under Ottoman sovereignty until 1925, when it officially became a British crown colony.⁴ In 1960, Cyprus gained independence after its Greek and Turkish communities reached an agreement regarding the country’s constitution. Accordingly, the Republic of Cyprus was established under a “complex constitutional structure that was specifically designed to balance power between the Greek Cypriot community (78% of the population) and Turkish Cypriot community (18% of the population).”⁵ As part of this agreement, the president was elected by the Greek Cypriot community and the vice president by the Turkish Cypriot community, government posts and public offices were allocated by ethnic quotas among the two communities, the Turkish Cypriot community was given a permanent veto and guaranteed 30 percent representation in the parliament and administration, and the three mother-states—Greece, Great Britain, and Turkey—were granted guarantor rights.

Within a few years, the mixed government of the Republic of Cyprus had collapsed. Turkish Cypriots ended their involvement in state institutions and, following intercommunal clashes, the UN Security Council passed a resolution to establish a peacekeeping force (UNFICYP).

On 20 July 1974, Turkey invaded Cyprus from the north in response to a military coup on the island that had been backed by Greece, and effectively partitioned the island. The northern third of Cyprus then became the Turkish Cypriots’ internationally unrecognized territory, while the southern two-thirds was (and is) under the control of Greek Cypriots. In 1975, Turkish Cypriots established an independent administration in the north, and there was an agreement for population exchange. The UN peacekeeping forces estimate that 165,000 Greek Cypriots fled or were expelled from the north, and 45,000 Turkish Cypriots from the south. The UNFICYP currently patrols the UN Buffer Zone, commonly called the Green Line. For almost 40 years, the Green Line has divided the northern from the southern part of Cyprus and stood as an obstacle to interactions between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities.⁶ Hence, the Greek and Turkish communities of Cyprus behave like de facto separate states even though they are part of the same island and—at least de jure—of the same country.

Economic divergence

The division of the island also influenced the two communities’ economic development trajectories: Following the partition, the differences between the two sides’ per capita income and living standards were substantially magnified. As Figure 1 shows, in 1977, the ratio of the average Turkish Cypriot per capita income to Greek Cypriot per capita income was 67 percent. From this high point, the ratio deteriorated and, by 2003, had decreased to 39 percent.⁷

In 2004, less than ten days before the official date that Cyprus was to join the European Union, and following negotiations to unify the island, the two Cypriot communities voted at double referenda.⁸ However, while Turkish Cypriots accepted the unification plan, Greek Cypriots did not, and the country remains divided. Despite the lack of a comprehensive peace agreement reunifying the country, the Republic of Cyprus became a member of the EU.

The Green Line regulation

In line with Protocol 10 of the EU Accession Treaty 2003 and to improve the economic wellbeing of the Turkish Cypriot community, which only had access to ties with Turkey between 1974 and 2004 and was otherwise isolated, the EU introduced in 2004 the so-called Green Line regulation. It promised...
financial aid to facilitate trade and promote economic development. More specifically, the regulation (Council Regulation EC No. 866/2004) was conceived to develop “trade and other links” between the Republic of Cyprus and “those areas in which the Government of the Republic of Cyprus does not exercise effective control”—the north—until a settlement regarding a reunited Cyprus is (if ever) reached. The regulation covered the crossing of persons, goods, and services across the line. Accordingly, the regulation designated official crossing points for both goods and persons and stipulated provisions for the taxation of goods between the Republic of Cyprus and the north.

As Figure 2 shows, initially, the volume of Green Line trade grew steadily, but as from 2009, the global economic crisis thwarted its continued rise. At its advent, the composition of Green Line trade was dominated by wood products and furniture (18 percent in 2005) and building stones and articles (12 percent in 2005). In later years, while trade in wood products and furniture remained significant (12 percent in 2010), trade in fish (15 percent in 2010), vegetables, and fruits increased. So far, no established pattern of trade has emerged, and there has been wide fluctuation in each commodity category.

Even during the period of expansion between 2004 and 2009, however, there was a sizable gap between potential and actual volumes of trade. In a 2012 article, researchers found that actual trade reached only around 10 percent of its potential. Legal constraints account for 35 percent of the missing trade, extra transportation costs for about 5 percent, and unmeasurable and social-psychological barriers for a significant amount between 48 and 60 percent. Some of these unmeasurable barriers arose as a result of the Turkish Cypriot community’s relative isolation and, due to the collective action problem often found within societies with limited resources, these barriers could not be remedied by the local actors themselves.9

Greek Cypriots were able to freely trade with the rest of the world via the internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus. They acquired access to international institutions, and began accession talks to become an EU member. Accordingly, they harmonized their laws and regulations in regard to EU health and environmental standards. In contrast, the Turkish Cypriot community was isolated from the international environment and excluded from full participation in local, regional, and global integration opportunities. Although it was theoretically possible for Turkish Cypriots to obtain access to external opportunities through Turkey’s custom union with the EU—the Ankara Agreement—all too often this path contained hidden trade barriers.10

All in all, the conflict-inspired divergences and the resulting disparity between north Cyprus’ and the Republic of Cyprus’ products are serious obstacles to conducting economic transactions across the Green Line.11

Standards concerns

The initial Green Line regulation expressly prohibited the movement of animal products across the Green Line due to health standards concerns (No. 866/2004, Article 4:9). Trade in plant products, such as potatoes and citrus fruits, was permitted, but such products were subject to EC phytosanitary checks before being allowed across the Line (No. 866/2004, Annex II). Turkish Cypriot potato farmers had little difficulty passing these checks: After two seasons of successful testing, potatoes were cleared for trade in 2006 (Annual Report, 2006). In 2006, the European Commission began working on lifting...
the prohibition on trading animal products for two such products, namely honey and fish. By March of 2007, the Commission had formally adopted a decision to allow fish and honey from the Turkish Cypriot part of the island to be traded across the line, provided that Turkish Cypriot fishing vessels were able to meet certain hygiene standards and that samples of Turkish Cypriot honey successfully passed EU testing. Adhering to the hygiene standards proved relatively straightforward and trade in fish grew rapidly following this decision; however, trade in honey was stymied due to the discovery of various contaminants (pesticides and antibiotics) in the samples collected by the Commission’s independent experts.

**Table 1: Size and geographical location of the beekeepers**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>No. of beekeepers</th>
<th>No. of beekeepers with ≥ 70 hives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kyrenia</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicosia</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Famagusta</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iskele</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morphou</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>485</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Reybroeck (2012).*

**Turkish Cypriot beekeepers**

The standards of beekeeping in the EU and those in north Cyprus diverged significantly. Beekeeping operations in the north tended to be quite small and often were side businesses. As such, many beekeepers used outdated instruction manuals, fought bee diseases with antibiotics prohibited by the EU, and engaged in questionable hygiene practices. Unaware of the EU standards and unorganized, Turkish Cypriot beekeepers lacked the capacity to establish the necessary guidelines and training facilities, and to institutionalize quality sampling, testing, and certifying. Although every single small-scale beekeeping operation would have benefitted from such capacities, the associated cost made it implausible that any one beekeeper could undertake the necessary changes alone. Simply put, Turkish Cypriot beekeepers were subject to a collective action problem. Moreover, uncertainty over whether beneficial transactions could actually occur in light of the historical animosities between the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities made collective action—the conventional, rational solution to this issue—an unlikely option.

As is evident from the failure of the Turkish Cypriot honey samples to pass EU health and quality tests, the existing institutions alone—the Turkish-Cypriot Chamber of Commerce, the Beekeepers Association, and the Turkish Cypriot authorities responsible for agricultural affairs in the north—were unable to overcome the obstacle posed by the EU’s standards. Clearly, they needed a push from a willing external actor (a technically and financially capable actor) to provide necessary and sufficient communication and coordination among the Turkish Cypriot beekeepers and enact change.

Council Regulation (EC) No. 389/2006 of 27 February 2006 established an instrument of financial support for encouraging the economic development of the Turkish Cypriot community. With the overall goal of facilitating reunification, Regulation 389/2006 provided that the funds that had been “earmarked [by the EC] for the northern part of Cyprus in the event of a settlement should be used to ... [encourage] the economic development of the Turkish Cypriot community.” Under this aid program, the European Commission has implemented various assistance mechanisms to help Turkish Cypriot beekeepers meet EU standards (discussed below.) As of 14 February 2013, tests demonstrated that the standards of honey have improved, and honey from Turkish Cypriot beekeepers may now be traded across the Green Line.

Table 1 shows fewer than 500 Turkish Cypriot beekeepers, relatively evenly distributed throughout the northern part of Cyprus. The small-scale of these beekeeping operations is noteworthy: 87 percent of the beekeepers have fewer than 70 hives, with an average hive number of 30. According to Turkish Cypriot Beekeepers Association officials, beekeepers in the north harvest approximately 35 kilograms of honey per hive. Thus, given the retail price of US$12 per kilogram of liquid honey, and the scale of production in the north, beekeeping is not the primary occupation of the majority of beekeepers. To wit: Even if all sales are at retail price, the total average annual revenue would amount to only US$7,500 (i.e., 30 hives times 35 kilograms of comb honey per hive times 0.6 kilogram liquid honey from 1 kilogram comb honey times US$12 per kilogram). If the profit margin is as high as 40 percent, then the net profit is US$3,000, or only 26 percent of the average per capita income of US$11,700 in the north. In fact, most of the beekeepers are not even farmers; instead, many are public officials who have various desk jobs as their chief occupation and attend to the hives either after work hours or (primarily) on the weekends.12

Years of economic isolation, the lack of incentives to be more efficient and competitive in foreign or domestic markets, and the ideal conditions for free-ridership—small potential...
return for improving the public good and large numbers of small-scale operations—combined to result in the Turkish Cypriot beekeepers’ failure to adopt modern honey production standards. That most of the beekeepers are not full-time honey-producing professionals only exacerbated the issue and made external actor intervention all the more necessary.13

EU-initiated activities
Regulation 389/2006 specified that EU funds could be used for “preliminary and comparative studies, training, activities linked to preparing, appraising, managing, implementing, monitoring, controlling and evaluation of assistance ...” (Article 4). To help solve the dilemma of the Turkish Cypriot beekeepers, the EU primarily employed its funds to (1) support training and educational programs, (2) upgrade the equipment used by the beekeepers, and (3) foster collectivization among them. To gauge the progress of such programs, the EU also implemented annual sampling of the honey produced at 10 (minimum) honey production sites.

Training and educational programs included sessions on the prevention, diagnosis, and proper treatment of several common honeybee diseases, such as the extremely damaging American foulbrood and varroaosis (a disease carried by the mite, varroa destructor). In the case of the American foulbrood, which is highly contagious, treatment can be quite complex. The disease is caused by spore-forming bacteria, and treatment—whether antibiotic or chemical—only eliminates the symptoms of the disease and does not kill the spores themselves. Spores of the bacteria may remain viable for over 40 years, and previously infected hives thus require perpetual treatment if they are to be reused. In some cases, burning the hives is the only option for effective containment of the disease. The presentations on diseases also included information on EU veterinary drug legislation since drug legislation and control in the EU was highly divergent from that used in the Turkish Cypriot part of the island. Many of the common Turkish Cypriot handbooks on beekeeping promoted the use of illegal (within the EU) veterinary drugs, such as antimicrobials—banned as they unnecessarily increase the resistance of bacteria to antibiotics—and fumagillin—prohibited due to its possible link with human birth defects. As would be expected considering the disparity in standards, the initial samples of Turkish Cypriot honey contained high levels of drugs outlawed within the EU.14

Beekeepers attending the educational sessions were additionally advised on the EU’s regulations concerning pesticides and the maximum EU-acceptable levels of contaminants in honey. Of particular concern for the EU were the storage conditions of the collected honey, since the initial samples had contained high levels of heavy metals and hydroxymethylfurfural (HMF), both of which result from improper storage practices. The heavy metal contamination was due to the use of galvanized containers as long term storage vessels for the collected honey. Since honey is highly acidic, it quickly leeches the coat of zinc from the galvanized container and can become toxic. With EU financial support several of the Turkish Cypriot beekeepers were able to replace their galvanized containers with stainless steel containers. HMF, also a toxic contaminant, forms due to heat exposure. During the training, the beekeepers were advised on the ideal temperature for honey storage.15

The initial training sessions were funded by the EU, coordinated by “an institutive partner of the European Union Commission in the process of the Green Line Regulation” (the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce),16 and conducted by a Belgian expert from the Institute for Agricultural and Fisheries Department of Food Safety. Once the EU provided a path for the Turkish Cypriot beekeepers to follow, local leaders emerged. Under a program in which the EU provided half of the funding and a beekeeper the other, local beekeeper Krata Kasapoğlu was able to upgrade his equipment to include seven of the eight EU-recommended beekeeping technologies. Upon receipt of these state of the art machines for different stages of honey production such as harvesting, uncapping, extracting, filtering, storing, and bottling, Krata Kasapoğlu, one of the few beekeepers with over 70 hives, held a training session attended by 119 local beekeepers at which he further reinforced best beekeeping practices. Those who attended the training received certificates. The yearly sampling conducted by the EU’s independent experts demonstrated steady improvement, attributed largely to the aforementioned training sessions.

Furthermore, the EU stressed that additional funding would be forthcoming only if the beekeepers established a cooperative. Following this recommendation, the Turkish Cypriot Beekeepers Cooperative formed. Acting through this cooperative, Turkish Cypriot beekeepers significantly reduced their production costs, in part because they were now able to pursue alternative sources of supplies (previously beekeepers had been subjected to a de facto monopoly on beekeeping materials) and had substantially increased bargaining power.

In February of 2013, all samples complied with EU standards and the Commission expected the imminent onset of honey trade across the line.

Concluding remarks
The Green Line did more than physically divide Cyprus: It also changed the development course of both sides. Isolated from the EU in terms of its health and quality standards, Turkish
Cypriots needed the involvement of an external actor to overcome the cleavages initialized by conflict and solve the local collective action problem that arose from the entrenchment of those cleavages.

In less than seven years, Turkish Cypriot beekeepers managed to catch up with the EU’s health, quality, and environmental standards. The previously existing gap was a result of the Turkish and Greek Cypriots’ divergent paths in economic development and regional integration during the prolonged conflict. These divergences and the ensuing disparity in Turkish and Greek Cypriots’ honey production were serious obstacles to realizing economically beneficial transactions in a post-conflict setting. Without intervention by an informed third party (the EU), Turkish Cypriot beekeepers would have remained unable to capitalize on Green Line trade. Navigating the EU’s relatively complex health and safety standards was beyond the ability of Turkish Cypriot beekeepers: Not only had they been trained with handbooks that recommended prohibited medications and outdated storage practices, but the status of beekeeping as a side operation meant that they lacked the time, finances, and motivation to research and apply improvements on their own.

The characteristics of the Turkish Cypriot honey industry and the difficulty of solving the standards issue combined to create an ideal environment for the classic collective action problem. As we explained, the EU honey standards were complex and there were a large number of small-scale Turkish Cypriot beekeeping operations. The necessary conditions for free-ridership existed, and the problem was intensified by the limited means of the small-scale beekeepers. Therefore, it was not likely that the local actors would be able to solve the sector’s collective action problem by themselves.

Even if trust issues still prevent Turkish and Greek Cypriots from fully realizing the potential of Green Line honey trade, Turkish Cypriots have gained from EU intervention. In our interviews, officials of the Turkish Cypriot Beekeepers Association shared with us their vision of creating a brand name for the honey produced in the north, emphasizing organic production and, under the umbrella of their cooperative, expanding their market beyond the borders of Cyprus. Since they managed to meet the European standards, they are now more confident, they say, in their ability to increase production of higher quality honey, and to export it in a consistent manner. Through the use of their cooperative, it is certainly possible that Turkish Cypriots will shortly be able to export to the rest of the EU. Moreover, Turkish Cypriots now consume healthier honey; thus, EU intervention had a direct improvement in their quality of life as well.

This case demonstrates how a benevolent third party can play a meaningful role in solving a collective action problem. In addition to providing funds to support training and educational programs and to upgrade the equipment used by the beekeepers, a third party such as the EU can provide the impetus for domestic institutions, such as producers associations, chambers of commerce, and cooperatives, to form, to coordinate the necessary activities for trade, like quality sampling, and to create a better environment through the use of collective learning. Doing so will help to sustain economic growth.

In addition to the EU, international organizations, the World Bank, UNDP, national international development agencies such as USAID, as well as international development NGOs can use the experience of the Turkish Cypriot beekeepers as a positive example for the design of their future development initiatives. Development challenges caused by inadequate health, quality, and environmental standards are not unique to Cyprus, but are found in most post-conflict and emerging economies. As mentioned, these challenges often remain unresolved due to the presence of a collective action problem. In this case, the small scale of most of the operations and the status of honey production as a supplemental occupation made standards adjustment infeasible for the local actors. When assessing how best to aid local actors in solving their development challenges, external actors need to be especially cognizant of the challenges presented by small-scale enterprises. Additionally, the experiences of the beekeepers demonstrate that such development programs can be sustainable if they encourage the local actors to assume ownership of the program. By providing initial technical and financial inputs, the external actor can inspire the creation of local collectives that share these resources among the greater community.

Notes
We thank the Turkish Cypriot Beekeepers Association’s officials, in particular Eriş Coban and Kurata Kasapoğlu, for granting an interview, beekeeper Mehmet Kaynak for sharing his experiences, and Balkız Kandulu and Çiğdem Aksu of the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce for providing useful information. We also thank Andrea Bartoli, Jurgen Brauer, Edward Tower, the participants of the Session 4b: Organizational Networks and Support of the 2013 Leadership for Peace and Prosperity Conference, San Diego, CA, 3-5 October 2013, and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments and suggestions.

2. Cyprus has been divided into a Turkish Cypriot northern region and a Greek Cypriot southern region since 1974. A UN mission called UNFICYP is responsible for the area that separates the two sides, the Buffer Zone. The zone—also referred to as the Green Line—extends approximately 180 kilometers across the island. (From the official web page of the UNFICYP, http://www.unficyp.org/)


5. Ker-Lindsay, 2011, p. 25.


7. Ratios: Gokcekus (2008, p. 15). It is important to note that, during the period of economic isolation, the share of agricultural products and processed agricultural goods in total exports steadily declined from 83 percent in the late 1970s (1977-1979) to 61 percent in the early 2000s (2000-2003). Moreover, the share of citrus and potatoes decreased from 68 percent and 7 percent to 31 percent and 1 percent, respectively.

8. For the entire text of the 2004 comprehensive solution, known as the Annan Plan, see http://www.hri.org/docs/annan/ [accessed 9 May 2014].


10. Among Turkish Cypriots there is a widely held view that Turkey, in order to better control the northern part of Cyprus, systematically erected barriers to impede Turkish Cypriots’ economic progress and ensure their financial dependence on aid from Turkey. Difficulties at Turkish customs, in particular at the main commercial seaport, Mersin, are among the most prominently cited barriers (Gokcekus, 2014). During our interviews, one of the beekeepers said that in 2002 he was able to secure an export contract with a British company; however, the Turkish authorities refused to grant the beekeeper health certificates and the contract fell through.


16. Established in 1958, the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce was the first Turkish Cypriot organization to be internationally recognized, via membership at the International Chamber of Commerce (see http://www.ktto.net/english/history.html) [accessed 9 May 2014]. Only (1) goods that are wholly obtained in the north, or (2) have gone their last, substantial, economically justified processing or working in an undertaking equipped for the purpose in the north are allowed to cross the Green Line (EC 866/2004). The Chamber is authorized by the EU Commission to award certificates of origin, “The Accompanying Document,” for the goods (other than live animals and animal products).

References


http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022343301038003001


http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0297.00609